How public sector pay and employment affect labor markets : research issues by Stevenson, Gail
Polloy  Research  |wils  o"q4  t
WORKING  PAPERS
Education  and  Employment
Population  and  Human  Resources
Department








Policy meform  has focused  on the reform of large, inefficient
public sectors because  of their cumulative  negative  effects on
economic growth and competitiveness.  The slow progress in
restructuring  the public  sector in many countries  highlights  the
need to address - more forcefully and more subtly - how
public sector  policies  affect the labor market.
IbePalcy Reseach  Wozking  Papezss disminte  the-fuidings  of  wokiiqprogand  enctwagetheexchangeof  ideas  among  Bank  saff
and all  heas  internsted  ndevlopnetissz  17hesepapcxs,  distibuted by the  Research  Advisory  Staff.  carry  thenames  oftheauthors,
reflec1lyd  iirview  and  shouldb used  and ited  acordingly.  befindings,imtpretations,  and  concluions  are  theauthorsown.They

















































































































Education  and Employment
WPS 944
This paper  -a  product of the Education and Employment Division, Population and Human Resources
Department - is part of a series of state-of-the-art studies of employment and labor market issues and
refonn  programs. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact PHREE, room S6-035, extension 33680 (August 1992,33 pages).
Structurally, the public sector has a more impor-  rial and technical workers in the civil service.
tant economic role to play in developing coun-  The resulting skill imbalances in the rest of the
tries than in industrial countries, particularly in  domestic economy reduce international competi-
how it affects labor markets.  tiveness in some countries.
Evidence from many developing countries  Policy reform has focused on the reform of
shows that public sector pay, employment, and  large, inefficient public sectors because of their
performance are hurting the labor markets'  cumulative negative effects on economic growth
ability to allocate workers among sectors and  and competitiveness. Policies to adjust relative
skill requirements. In many countries, the civil  prices from nontradables toward tradables have
service and the public sector wage bill have  led to some movement of employment out of the
grown to unsustainably high levels. The public  public sector, but significant rigidities remain.
sector is so big that interventions in the sector -
with or without spillover effects into the  Workers are attracted to the public sector
nonpublic sector - make it more difficult for  because of complex economic and social incen-
wages and employment to respond to shifts in  tives that are difficult to change - and the
demand and supply.  relationship between public sector interventions
and the underlying political and economic forces
Nonwage benefits are seldom related to  is an important area for research. The slow
productivity, so they can be particularly distort-  progress in restructuring the public sector in
ing. At the same time, a long-tenm drop in real  many countries highlights the need to address
civil service wages and the compression of wage  more forcefully and more subtly how public
ranges have caused critical shortages of manage-  sector policies affect the labor market.
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The public sector employs a large share of the formal sector work force and absorbs a large
portion of government recurrent spending  in many developing  countries. At least in the early years of the fiscal
retrenck nent begun in the late 1970s and early 1980s,  governments placed a high priority on maintaining  the
level of public employment,  often at the expense of wages -- and, eventually,  morale and productivity. These
developments  have led to a renewed debate on the appropriate role and size of the public sector as well as to
a broad consensus -- that whatever its size -- the public  sector must function  as efficiently  as possible. For these
reasons, public sector wage and employment policies  have been the focus  of recent research and policy  interest.
Although there is broad agreement about some of the issues and their consequences  for labor markets, empirical
work  on developing  countries is sketchy, and the results  are, at times, inconclusive.  This paper reviews  the issues
and the empirical literature on the relationship between public sector employment,  pay, and performance, and
competitive labor markets.  Because the size and the role of the public sector is qualitatively different in
developing  countries, the overview  focuses  on these countries and ignores the literature on the public sector role
in industrial  countries. The review  also skips  issues specific  to public  enterprises and their restructuring,  but does
provide comparative data on the parapublic and public sectors, where relevant.
The role of the public  sector is particularly  salient in light of the rcnewed emphasis  on efficient
labor markets as critical  to sustainable  growth. Labor markets have  three kinds of effects on allocative  efficiency
between  the macro- and microeconomies. They  match labor supply and demand between  workers and employers
through the wage rate.  They allocate workers among sectors by matching skills with  job requirements through
relative wages. And, they provide information about incentives  for the allocation of resources over time, i.e., for
human resource development  through education and training. Evidence has accumulated  -- some anecdotal and
some empirical -- that a large public sector impedes the competitive  functioning of labor markets and of the
overall economy.
Public sector employment is thus an important concern for policymakers and researchers
because of its contribution to fiscal  imbalances,  its effects on private labor markets, and the distortions  that often
affect human capital formation and the government's ability  to produce goods and services efficiently. Each of
these roles will be discussed in turn in light of the effect of these imbalances  on labor markets.
Of particular interest is the economic  restructuring under way in Central and Eastern Europe
and in the former U.S.S.R. Reforms have led to sharp drops in output and real wages along with steep rises
in unemployment and officially  measured poverty.  Since most or all of the modern sector labor force was
publicly employed -- often with massive labor redundancies -- it is misleading to talk about "the appropriate
balance between public and private" during the transition.  The modern sector is generally considered to be
composed of public  and private enterprises that are subject to prevailing  industrial  and labor regulations. Under
the command system, there was no real market for labor -- the price of labor was not intended to allocate labor
or to determine techniques of production such as capital and labor intensity. Because input and output prices,2
including  the price of labor, were distorted, and because there was almost no legal private sector except for small
shops, the labor market issues facing  the postsocialist  economies  are quantitatively  -- and perhaps qualitatively  -
different from those facing  the developing  world. But public  sector wage  and employment  similarities  are many--
real wage erosion, wage compression, an overextended  and inefficient  public sector, skill imbalances,  corruption
and other leakages -- and  the lessons learned from evaluations of public sector employment in developing
countries apply multiplicatively  to the developing  markets for labor in most postsocialist economies.
This paper comprises three sections.  The first section summarizes the issues surrounding
government's role as employer and  producer.  It  discusses the mechanisms by which a  large sector with
administered wages and objectives other than profit-maximization -- tI.. public sector -- could affect labor
markets.  The third section reviews empirical studies -- most of them culled from the Latin American and
African experiences -- that have attempted to measure the effects of the public sector on the economies and
labor markets of developing  countries. The section also provides  parameters for vague concepts  like "the public
sector is too large,"  and "the price of labor is too high." The paper concludes with  implications for public sector
employment policies -- and thoughts on directions for future research.
B.  The Role Of The Public  Sedor-1heo  And Stlized  Fac
Discussions of "the public sector" may refer  to some or all  of the  following: the central
government civil  service or the civil  service at all levels  of government, public servants like teachers and health
care workers who may or may not be a formal part of the civil  service, and employees of public enterprises. In
general, data limitations -- particularly cross-country  -- restrict the analysis  to the central government.
The large, overstaffed,  and inefficient  public sector bureaucracy in many developing  countries
results from a number of forces. The rapid growth of public  employment  -- variously  defined -- during the 1960s
and  1970s in newly independent countries in Africa was in response to  a  perceived need to  provide the
infrastructure for development as well as basic social services. Government provision of basic education and
health care at little or no cost to the beneficiary  was seen as necessary  to both growth and poverty  alleviation.
At the same time, high rates of population growth were forcing  increasingly  large cohorts of new entrants into
the labor force.  In many countries, there was a parallel expansion  of public or quasi-public enterprises -- to
promote development,  to fill in the gaps of an inadequate private sector, to provide employment for educated
nationals  who would  otherwise emigrate, to provide  government  revenues, and perhaps to provide patronage for
politically  important groups (Robinson 1991,  313).  Outside of Africa, particularly in Latin America, the rapid
growth of public sector employment was associated with import substitution, which required widespread state
intervention.3
Employment-generating  policies were often viewed  as tools for jump-starting economic  growth
and redistributing incomes. As the fiscal  crises of the late 1970s  and early 1980s deepened, countries and the
international development organizations were forced to  take a  hard  look at  the  size and composition of
government  spending. There was growing  concern that government  consumption--much  of it wages  in developing
countries as a large share of GDP h1irt  economic  growth. Although the evidence on this point is controversial,'
a consensus  evolved  that employment and growth could be more efficiently  generated by private investment --
or by government investment in inputs complementary to private production -- than by a similar amount of
recurrent spending on public sector wages. As growth stagnated and government financial resources became
increasingly  strained, direct or indirect government involvement  in the production of most goods and many
services--public  or quasi-public enterprises -- became harder to justify on the grounds of growth or efficiency.
The present concern with the role of the public sector reflects not only issues of productive
efficiency,  but is a fundamental component of -- and is driven by -- structural adjustment. A large share of the
recurrent  budget of many governments is wages, which means fiscal retrenchment  is synonymous with a
substantial reduction in the size of the state, as well as increased efficiency. This process also implies shifting
the initiative  for growth to the private  sector. Because  of the public  sector's central role in the modern economy,
the movement to reduce the size of the public sector has not only  budgetary,  but also macroeconomic,  political,
employment,  and labor market effects.
The pattern of public  sector retrenchment is predictable,  proceeding from politically  innocuous
to politically  costly measures. The typical response of a developing  country facing a budget constraint is to cut
capital spending,  with negative effects on growth and on infrastructure development. The second stage usually
entails cutting  nonwage recurrent spending,  which tends to reduce the availability  of complemeutary inputs and
can severely  affect productivity  and output. Next,  wage growth or wages  are capped or frozen, then employment
is capped by stopping recruitment, eliminating  ghost workers, revoking employment guarantees, and invoking
other  methods that  do  not affect the  already employed.  Last, retrenchment  begins with nonpermanent
employees,  those near retirement age, and others who can be laid  off with minimum  political  cost (Nunberg 1988;
Robinson 1991,  315).  Only as a last resort are large numbers of public servants laid off.
C  The public  sector-paradigm  lost
There is broad acknowledgement  of a series of stylized facts (Nunberg and Nellis 1990:2-4).
The public sector is too large because it is administratively  and functionally  unwieldy  and because it employs  too
many people -- many agencies are overstaffed  relative to other inputs or to output.  Second, the public sector
is too expensive in that the wage bill for government employees consumes too large a share of GDP  or of
government  income to the detriment of other expenditures. Third, although the wage bill is excessive,  individual
compensation is often low -- particularly  at the higher levels. Fourth, civil  servants are ineffective  or inefficient.4
They do not adequately complete their assigned tasks or complete them more slowly or at higher cost than
optimal. Fifth, because government is the wage leader of the modern sector, government pay and employment
distortions negatively  affect private labor markets.
The mechanisms by which these imbalances  are induced and maintained are well-known;  this
paper focuses on the efficiency  costs of public sector policies. Public sector wage setting and indexation, job
guarantees, lifelong employment security,  and fringe and nonwage  benefits may all distort the price and supply
of labor.  Minimum  wage regulations set a floor below which  wages cannot fall, even when the market-clearing
wage would do so.  Because workers cannot be offered a lower wage, some are dismissed and some must find
jobs in the informal sector, where wages are lower and flexible  and labor laws are not enforced. Thus, formal
sector workers keep their jobs at the expense of workers in the informal sector, and tle  equity  consequences  can
be severe. Although  economywide  wage dispersion  may increase,  the range of public  sector wages  is compressed,
resulting in disincentives  for skills training on the part of providers and beneficiaries (see for example, World
Bank, 1990). In particular, across-the-board minimum wages  without special provisions  for young people who
are  either  unskilled  or  in  on-the-job  training  programs  --  a  subminimum  wage  --  represent  a  substantial
disincentive  to hiring these job-seekers. 2
Public sector wage indexation may promote inflation and lessen or change the distributional
effects of policies that cut or change expenditure.  By raising the cost of public sector labor, indexation alsu
transfers the burden of labor market adjustment to  those not covered by indexation and the  unemployed.
Employment security regulations may severely  impede labor market flexibility  by raising significantly  the time
and costs of dismissing unproductive or surplus workers -- making labor a quasi-fixed factor of production.
Similarly,  guaranteed employment  schemes  for secondary  and university  graduates can severely  restrict the ability
of the public  sector to control employment. The schemes also can affect the demand for education, encouraging
students who might otherwise opt for vocational or technical training to attend a university,  often in a general,
rather than a scientific or technical field (ILO 1990:20).
Government pay scales with automatic seniority increases lead to a growing  wage bill even in
the absence of wage increases, and are a built-in impediment  to restricting spending on wages, forcing the real
wage or the level of employment  to adjust.  The costs of job security -- implicit or expiicit -- may be passed on
to the employed in the form of lower  wages, and to job-seekers in the form of private sector employer reluctance
to hire new workers in an expansionary  period because of the difficulty  of shedding  labor in a downturn. A large
part of the compensation package in many civil services consists of deferred wages  -- such as pensions and
severance packages, or nonwage  benefits,  like travel and expense allowances  or housing  subsidies. Fringe  benefit
systems are usually  opaque in execution,  often corrupt, and result in horizontal inequity as workers at the same
level tend to receive different total compensation (Lindauer, Meesook, and Suebsaeng 1988:23).5
Government fringe benefits, like paid sick leave and allowances and subsidies for various
purposes, are seldom legislatively  extended to cover the private sector.  They may, however, have significant
spillover effects, most directly on labor supply behavior.  The benefits increase the total cost of labor to the
public sector and make wage setting less open and fair -- and thus may induce rent-seeking behavior. All of
these measures, depending upon their coverage, lead to labor markets that are segmented between covered and
uncovered  groups. There may be increasing  unemployment  as workers try to move from the low-wage  uncosered
sector to the higher-wage  covered sector.
Last, the  size, composition and wage structure of the  civil service can profoundly affect
education and training. In many low-income  African countries, the education system  is oriented toward modern
sector employment in general, and the civil  service  in particular. And wage compression  may further discourage
investment in education  and training in specialties  that are neeaed. In addition, during the economic  stagnation
of the  late  1970s and  early  1980s, some governments increased pressure  on  the  educational system by
guaranteeing civil  service employment for some groups, such as university  graduates -- usually  after a waiting
period -- although such measures are strongly discouraged today on grounds of efficiency  and equity.  The
promise -- explicit for university  graduates, implicit for less-well-educated  job-seekers -- of secure, sometimes
prestigious public sector employment  created a vicious  cycle  of escalating expenditure  and expectations. Higher
education systems came under increased pressure as more people sought entrance.
As more graduates were produced,  governments had to honor their commitment  by increasing
the numbers of civil  servants -- leading to budgetary pressures, overstaffing,  low  morale, absenteeism,  and other
problems. As the fiscal  crisis worsened in the 1970s  and early 1980s,  governments  hired more people at all skill
levels -- leading to a wage bill that crowded out other government functions, or to falling real wages for civil
servants, or  both.  When governments finally ended employment guarantees  and  attempted  to  restrict
employment,  there were new job-seekers in the private sector -- trained largely  at public expense -- with skills
inappropriate to employment outside the civil  service.
These processes in  a  prototypical economy have led  to  four generic  imbalances, most
consistently  in Africa -- too many civil servants, excessive public sector wage bills, erosion of public sector
salaries, and wage compression.
The public sector wage bill.  The public sector wage bill is measured as a share of the total
government budget, total government revenues, GDP -- or most commonly  -- total recurrent spending. If the
public sector wage bill grows so large that it crowds out other desirable recurrent expenditures -- typically  for
materials or operations and maintenance  -- the wage bill is too high and there likely are too many civil  servants.
If supplies and complementary  inputs for civil  servants are insufficient,  productivity  is hurt. Examples are legion
of teachers without  books or paper, hospitals  without  supplies,  and rural extension  services  without  vehicles,  tires,
or gasoline.6
The number of civil  servants. Governments often  hire countercyclically  rather than in response
to  a demand for certain skills.  The result is tuo many civil servants in certain categories -- unskilled and
semiskilled,  who may often be paid more than the reservation  wage -- and too few  skilled workers and managers,
who are paid less than the reservation wage at their level. Thus, not only the level of employment,  but the skill
composition of the civil service leads to inefficient  use of scarce resources.
The erosion of public  sector valaries. As many governments  became the employer  of last resort
-- at least for some groups -- government  employment policies came to serve both productive and distributive
functions,  and took precedence over the role of government as provider of employment to as many as possible
the role of government as producer of goods and services. Emp.loyment  maintenance or expansion  in the face
of severe budget constraints  was often accomplished  by letting  the real wage erode, particularly  at the higher skill
levels. In many countries, the return to civil  service employinent  fell not only below the reservation wage, but
sometimes far below GDP per capita, forcing  civil  servants tc hold second and third jobs. The cumulative  effect
was often a disastrous erosion of public sector productivity mnd  morale.
Wage compression. Wage compression  has resulted from several processes--allowing  the real
wage to fall proportionately more for civil  servants at higher skill levels  in response to budgetary pressures, or
raising the wage of the lowest-paid  workers to maintain political  support and patronage, promote social  justice,
or provide a minimum standard of living  for the employed. The outcome is an additional loss of higher-level
skills to the private sector, a process that further erodes civil  service productivity  and motivation (Nunberg and
Nellis 1990:3-4).
Effects ont  macroeconomy
These policies have extremely damaging consequences for  the  economy.  In  the  market  model,
government  employment,  pay and performance  standards can affect tl,e macroeconomy  in several  straightforward
ways. Government spending  on salaries and benefits is a component of aggregate demand and its management
is a component of demand management. A change in spending on wages will,  through the multiplier -- affect
aggregate demand.  If the wage bill rises without  a concomitant  increase in the production of goods, prices, the
level of imports, or both will rise, thus worsening  inflation or the balance of payments.  If the wage bill falls,
there will be a demand-led recession -- at least for the short term as labor is reallocated. Within a given wage
bill, the  distribution of wages according to  administrative criteria may lead  to  inequity and  inefficiency.
Additionally,  if the wag, policies affect the skill  mix and productivity  of the public sector, national output -- and
hence the individual's  share of it -- may be less than under a system more responsive to market signals.
The government  contributes  not only  to domestic  demand,  but also to domestic  production, most
of which is of services or public goods.  As government  producers are often monopolies and as the goods and
services are usually freely provided to beneficiaries, output prices are not market-determined.  Government7
spending on wages and other inputs that produce public goods may be stimulative,  contractionary, or neutral,
depending upon whether it produces goods and  services that enhance, diminish, or have no  effect on the
productivity  of the private capital stock.
Although government output prices are not usually  subject to market forces, input prices are.
An uncompetitive  price of labor cannot be easily  maintained in outward-oriented  productive  sectors. Therefore,
large public  sectors are often found  in countries  with import  -substituting  trade regimes. High tariff and non-tariff
barriers create excess demand for  import substitutes, and make production for the domestic market more
profitable than production for export.  Because  the domestic  sector is protected, competitive  pressuics on labor
markets are reduced. Although  there is no reason why a country's trade regime should define the size and role
of the public  sector, the two are often linked, resulting  in conditions  that allow  the most important modern sector
employer -- the public sector -- to affect the price and/or supply of at  least certain kinds of labor without
reference to market-clearing levels. 3
Because of high levels of protection, some sectors will be more capital intensive (the modern
sector), and  others  more labor  intensive than  in open-economy equilibrium, leading not only to  market
segmentation, but also to distorted price signals that affect incentives to acquire over time certain types of
education and training. This is also true of a government sector that allocates  factors of production with regard
to nonmarket criteria.
The  government's wage and  employment policies also  affect the  exchange rate  and  its
management.  The translation of a nominal devaluation into a real devaluation -- changes in relative prices --
depends upon interindustry factor mobility and flexible  real prices, so if the prict; and supply of labor  i a large
public  sector are prevented from changing,  the adjustment of real values is limited. Labor market segmentation,
induced at  least in part by a  large government sector, may reduce the effectiveness of an exchange rate
adjustment -- devaluation  -- because a nominal devaluation  is absorbed more by the informal than by the formal
sector due to indexation of government  wages. Thus, nominal adjustment affects covered and uncovered  groups
differently,  while the real adjustment that likely  would facilitate  growth is tempered or absent. 4
Within the formal sector, the effects of devaluation depend on the existence  of wage rigidity in
the tradable- and nontradable goods sectors. 5 If there is wage inflexibility  only in the government sector --
largely nontradables -- with limited spillover  effects on the private (tradable goods) sector, a devaluation will
cause prices to fall for tradables.  In a small, open economy, demand for tradables is unlimited, so labor is
absorbed in spite of wage rigidity in the public  sector. In such a case, demand and output attain previous levels,
but a larger share of output is in tradable goods (Horton and others 1991:19).
Evea with wage rigidity  in both sectors, however,  a real devaluation  that increases the price of
tradables compared with nontradables can still lead to increased productivity  and output in tradable goods.
Therefore, devaluation, labor market flexibility,  or both are necessary to achieve sustainable adjustment in8
dualistic economies, and the greater the wage rigidity,  the larger the needed devaluation, other things being
equal.  They key is whether the changes in relative prices lead to changes in the real economy, i.e., movement
of labor and a shift in output from nontradables to tradables.  As will be shown, declining  real public sector
salaries have led to  some movement out of the public sector, but to a  lesser extent and more slowly th
predicted.
Government employment,  pay, and performance can also affect the microeconomic  behavior
of firms and individuals. The response to a falling  real wage may be either an increased preference for leisure
or the transfer of work effort to outside endeavors where the returns are greater.  Even for those who do not
spend work time pursuing outside income, discipline can suffer, because those engaged in outside pursuits are
in no position to reprimand those who are not (Lindauer, Meesook, and Suebsaeng 1988:22). Those with
marketable skills tend  to seek employment outside government, where the pay is better.  The resulting skill
imbalances  within a production unit may further erode morale and productivity  due to a lack of workers with
complementary  or managerial  skills. Finally,  public  sector employment,  pay, and performance  policies may have
direct and indirect effects on the behavior of microeconomic  actors outside the public sector.
Spilover effects of government employment and pay
The spillover  effects of government  employment  and pay  include both static and dynamic  effects
for the private sector.
Static effects. Government spillover  effects may take the form of employment  and pay policies
that apply only to government, but which affect private employers. Or their policies may be intended to affect
the  private sector --  for examples minimum wages, wage indexation, severance restrictions or mandatory
severance compensation,  or the mandatory provision  of pensions  and other benefits. All of these interventions
raise the cost of labor -- or of certain kinds of labor -- to the private sector.
In economies  where a large part of formal sector employment  is in the public  sector, the private
sector labor market -- formal and informal -- acts as a parallel market to restore equilibrium. If spillover  effects
of deliberate restrictions on the private  sector prevent the formal sector from restoring equilibrium,  the informal
sector will act as the equilibrating parallel market.  When the government  is forced to reduce the budget and
current account deficits during macroeconomic adjustment, labor displaced by public sector retrenchment is
expected to be most readily absorbed by  tv, informal sector -- as the private formal sector firms involved  in the
production of nontradable or uncompetitive  goods are often shedding labor and retooling as well. How much
markets clear depends on the match of skills supplied and demanded, and also on the labor supply response.
Lindauer (1991b:78-84)  analyzes  the relationship between government wage and employment
policies by reference  to a  hypothetical African economy with a two-sector -- public and private -- formal
economy, and homogeneous labor skills and a homogeneous  job type across sectors. His model addresses the9
oft-contended notion that public sector wages in African countries are "too high" and presents three scenarios
in which pay policy derives from employment goals.  He also argues that government wage and employment
policies do not necessarily  spill over into the private sector in the absence of overt wage setting.
In the first scenario, government  workers are paid in accordance  with the reservation wage of
marginal workers. With an upward-sloping  labor supply curve, an expansion  of government programs  requiring
an increase in the number of workers must necessarily  entail a rise in thc wage rate, and thus "high"  wages. The
problem, however,  is not the wage rate, which results from market forces, but the expansion  of government.
In the second case, government  workers are paid more than the reservation wage for political
or societal reasons.  Relatively  fewer private sector jobs ere available at the higher wage offered in the public
sector.  Private employers may or may not hire more labor a. a lower wage, and workers may or may not be
willing to wait for scarce high-wage  jobs.  If the workers are willing  to wait, open unemployment can result.
Thus, government  y  policy  creates inefficiency  in the public  sector and may have spillover  effects in the primate
sector, depending on labor's response.
In the third scenario,  government  pay is below the reservation  wage -- for example, as the result
of a fiscal  crisis. Even if the government  cannot or will not terminate workers, the lower wage bill may translate
into lower wages -- if workers leave the public sector, wages are bid down, and the market clears at the lower-
than-reservation wage.  Alternatively,  workers may stay in government for a variety of reasons -- such as job
security,  subsidized housing and other nonwage entitlements, social status, or opportunities for exploiting  the
government position -- and work fewer hours in order to earn money in other ways. In either case,  avernment
pay objectives  will have been realized, but not employment and output targets.
Lindauer concludes  that it is incorrect to view government  pay policies as setting a standard to
which private employers feel forced to adhere, thereby causing  "high"  wages throughout the formal economy.
Rather, the spillover  effects in the absence of other regulations  like  wage setting depend upon the extent to which
government gy  policies facilitate the attainment of government employment goals. Any tendency for private
wages to follow  public wages -- in the absence of institutions that constrain private wage determination -- may
be attributed to labor supply  behavior  (Lindauer 1991b:87).  The proper focus  of attention is the optimum output
and  employment level of  government, and  hence  the  appropriate  division between public and  private
employment. Another important aspect is the disjuncture between wage and nonwage signals and their effect
on labor supply behavior.
The government  may choose to follow  a high-wage  policy  -- with wages above the reservation
wage -- throughout the modern sector, thereby generating open unemployment or shifting  employment to the
uncovered or informal sector at a market-clearing  wage. In this case, the absence of a pay differential between
the  public and  private formal sectors does not indicate market efficiency, but rather  that  the institutional
arrangements lead to or force wage parity.  Formal or informal market segmentation as a result of differing10
degrees of labor protection may also lead to persistent waiting unemployment  (Riveros 1990:24). All of these
arrangements have extensive  welfare consequences. They lower the output of both sectors, encourage rent-
seeking behavior by workers, and  tend to foster capital-intensity  in formal private sector production.  The
imbalance has two roots -- in government  pay policies and in an institutional  system  wherein the private sector
de jure or de facto must follow  the government's lead (Lindauer 1991b:84-85).  In this case, the focus  of attention
should be on reducing formal-informal  labor market segmentation.
The existence of unemployment does not automatically indicate labor market inefficiency,
however. First, unemployment  at the macro level  may be caused by inadequate  demand as recession  causes real
wages and the wage share in national income to faUl. If, as is generally agreed, the propensity to save out of
wages is less than the propensity to save out of profits, then an increase in savings  not offset by an increase in
investment will lead to a fall in aggregate demand and increased unemployment. Since this unemployment is
a demand problem, not a labor-market-adjustment  problem, advocating additional declines in the real wage
places an undue burden on labor markets.  Second, if product markets are uncompetitive,  unemployment  may
exist in spite of well-functioning  labor markets.  Third, labor markets may not work well, as evidenced by
mismatches  of labor supply  and demand within and across sectors, occupations,  and skills,  and over time (Horton
and others, 1991). In these cases, the solution  may  involve  a combination  of macro- and micropolicies,  depending
upon the source(s) of the disequilibrium.
Any attempt to evaluate the effects of labor market distortions must be analyzed for country
specific circumstances.  The effect of public sector interventions on the  private sector depends upon the
interventions' economic and sectoral coverage. The labor market effects of adjustment policies may be very
different if wage rigidities affect the entire formal sector, only tradable goods, or only some tradables -- for
example, importables. Another distinction  that would affect macropolicy  outcomes is the skill composition of
the tradable and non-tradable sectors.
A  second distinction--between  the statutory and actual incidence of effects--is also needed.
Depending upon the institutional  environment, public  sector interventions  may be legally  extended to cover none
or all of the formal sector. On the basis of a large cross-section  of countries, Heller and Tait (1984:8)  calculate
that, on average, 15 to 40 percent of the urban labor market in developing  and industrial countries is directly  or
indirectly  affected by the wage policies of the central government  alone -- excluding  state and local government
and public enterprises.  But, public sector wage legislation  that covers some or all of the private formal sector
may be enforced -- or may be widely  ignored. The true impact of public  sector wage and employment  legislation
must  be  analyzed in the  actual  -- not the  presumed  -- institutional  context.6
Dvnamic effects. The labor market effects of changes in public  sector pay or employment  will
depend on the skill levels, ages, sex, and occupations  of those affected. For example,  Edgren (1987:15)  argues
that public sector employment has been an important factor in increasing female participation rater  tn the11
modern sector labor force in Asia -- which is not to say that retrenchment would  necessarily  reverse the trend.
If retrenchment involves  mainly workers near retirement or those who will leave the labor force voluntarily,  or
workers who already have a second  job, the labor market effects may be minimal. One common  policy,  inducing
voluntary retirement through overly generous severance packages, may reduce civil  service employment with
minimal labor market effects. The fiscal benefits may be few to none, however,  as the government's  wage bill
may increase for a number of years.
Significant  public sector employment reductions usually destabilize the labor market.  Those
with the most marketable technical  and professional  skills usually  do not work in the public sector in the first
place because they can earn more on the outside and, if they do, they are in short supply and are too valuable
to be laid off (Robinson 1991:317). The effects of public sector retrenchment depend on whether the private
labor market is also in recession and, increasingly,  on the labor market institutions in place -- to facilitate the
transition to self-employment,  for example.  Robinson argues that laid-off civil servants probably need more
assistance  -- jobsearch skills and retraining -- than public  enterprise employees,  many of whom  have transferrable
skills. If the private sector is also retrenching, public  servants likely  have a double disadvantage  -- they have less
immediately transferrable skills, and they are often perceived by private employers as lacking discipline and
motivation.
The  above arguments consider wage and  employment rigidities in  the  private sector as
exogenously  determined -- whether directly  or through spillover  effects -- by the public  sector.  However, there
is a large body of literature on factors endogenous  to a firm's profit-maximizing  behavior  that contribute  to wage
rigidity,  see Riveros and Bouton, 1991. Efficiency  wage theory argues that the correct standard of value for the
cost of labor to a firm should be -- and according to this theory, implicitly  is -- a unit of labor efficiency  rather
than a physical unit of labor, a worker.  If workers have differing  productivities  unaccounted for by standard
variables -- age, gender, schooling,  seniority, regional differences,  -- and if the wage-efficiency  relationship and
labor turnover costs differ, wages for workers of similar skills may also differ within and across firms and
industries.  Assuming there  is a positive relationship between wages and productivity -- that higher labor
productivity  is induced by higher wages -- firms do not lower wages in the face of an excess supply of labor
unless there is a prolonged period of high unemployment.
Thus, persistent wage rigidity in the modern sector even in the face of adjustment measures
transfers the burden to the informal sector -- where the labor market functions neoclassically  -- and thus may
ultimately  weaken political  support for reforms which  appear ineffective  in the face of high unemployment. But,
such rigidity does not prove that the pLblic  sector is wage-determining. The policy  implication  is that firms will
respond to macroeconomic shocks by reducing employment,  but not wages, so that average wages and relative
wage differences  across sectors may not adjust unless  macropolicies  are accompanied by micropolicies. Further,
wages can be misleading indicators of rigidity or flexibility  because nonwage costs may offset wage changes,12
leaving the total labor cost unchanged.  Only an analysis of a total compensation package can shed light on
changes in the relative price of labor resulting  from macroeconomic  policies (Riveros and Bouton 1991:12).
Economic  theory provides explanations  for phenomena like unemployment,  wage rigidity,  and
wage segmentation. Although these phenomena may  be credibly  attributed to labor market rigidities  in general
--.and to public sector distortions in particular -- the plausible causal links are many and complicated.  If
efficiency  wage theory has application  to developing  economies--and  this remains largely  untested, (Riveros and
Bouton 1991:19)  - it is not possible,  even in a static analysis,  to conclude that wage and employment  rigidities
in the private formal sector along with open unemployment  are a priori evidence of spiliover  effects of labor
market distortions caused by the public sector. Hence, in a dynamic  context, the removal of public sector labor
market distortions  would  be necessary,  but not sufficient,  to promote labor market flexibility.  Similarly,  economic
reforms to enhance competitiveness  -- devaluation  and trade policy  liberalization  -- may or may  not induce public
sector labor market reforms, depending upon the relative importance of economic and sociopolitical  factors.
Thus, the questions to be answered empirically include: Is  the public sector important in
developing  countries in a way that it is not in developed countries? Are there wage and employment rigidities
and output effects in the public sector?  Do these spill over into the private sector?  Have changes in the
macroeconomic  environment led to intertemporal and intersectoral shifts in the real price and supply  of public
sector labor, or vice versa?
D.  EmpiricalStde
The empirical literature on the impact of public sector pay and employment on developing
country labor markets includes African and Latin American -- and a few Asian -- country case studies. Cross-
country  evaluations  are few because they present almost insurmountable problems of data comparability. There
is sufficient  evidence, however,  to provide careful answers to the questions posed in the preceding paragraphs.
The first issue is the effect on the macroeconomy  of the public sector, which is qualitatively  different -- and
greater -- in developing  than in industrial countries. Part of this impact is through the labor supply,  because the
public sector is the leading employer in many countries.  The impact of public sector labor's cost and its
components  -- wages,  nonwage  benefits,  and  wage  compression  --  on  private  and  public  labor  markets  is
discussed in a number of studies. The section concludes  with some evidence on the external effects of public
sector labor market adjustments.
Effecs of the publc  sector on the macroeconomy
Heller and Tait (1984:7-9)  present convincing  cross-country  data on the structural differences
in the role of government in developing  countries relative to industrial countries. First, the central governmentin developing  countries employs  a far larger share of the nonagricultural  labor force--23  percent (31 percent in
Africa)--compared with 9 percent, on average, for the OECD countries. 7 The public sector also absorbs a far
larger share of formal wage employment  in developing  countries--for  example,  almost 80 percent in Zambia and
other African  countries (including  parastatals), and 67 percent in  Bangladesh  (Lindauer, Meesook,  and Suebsaeng
1988,  3; Murshid and Sobhan 1987:1).
Second, there is a point of inflection -- 20 to 25 percent of nonagricultural  employment in the
public sector above which public  sector wages  do affect  national wage determination. This threshold is exceeded
in a number of Western European countries and is 24 percent of nonagricultural  employment, on average, in
the public sector in OECD  countries.  It is crossed in almost all countries in Africa (54 percent), Asia (36
percent) and, to a lesser extent, Latin America (27 percent).  Third, governments  particularly  in Africa tend to
be overstaffed  with administrators. Across all countries, there are 25 to 30 central government  employees per
100 inhabitants who have administrative  functions (Heller and Tait 1984:251.  This number is highest in Africa
(29 per 100), lowest in Asia (14 per 100), with Latin America and the OECD countries in the high range (22
and 25 per 100, respectively).
Data  on aggregate civil service employment are not sufficient, however, for the analysis of
underlying influences. Additional breakdowns  by job categories and skill  levels of workers, by job functions,  by
ministry or agency,  are needed.  In practice, data for such studies are often lacking,  unreliable, or inconsistent.
It is not uncommon, for example, for a ministry  of finance's figures  for the total number of civil servants and
the total wage bill to differ (sometimes greatly), from the sum of the totals for the individual  ministries. Thus,
the notion of a  public sector that  employs "too many workers" is often a  residual concept derived from
inadequate operating budgets for nonsalary budget posts. Nonetheless,  the available  data indicate that a large
public sector can negatively  affect the economy in a number of budgetary and extra-budgetary  ways.
Impact  on employment
Although public sector employment does not respond to  macroeoconomic signals, many
governments hire countercyclically  (ILO 1990:19),  and are then unable to release labor countercyclically  --
supporting the notion that the public sector does respond first and foremost to political economy concerns.
Empirical substantiation for the contention that the result is a surplus of public  servants (relative  to a base year)
would be provided by the following:  the ratio of the rate of growth of government  employment (or spending on
employment) to the rates of growth of GDP, all government spending, tax revenues, the total working age
population, the modern sector labor force, or other indicators.
The wage bill as a  share of government spending.  The wage bill as a  share of central
government spending fell from 20.3 percent to 18.7  percent for developing  countries in the aggregate between
1980 and 1987. The wage bill share rose slightly  in Asia and sharply in the Middle East, remained constant in14
Africa, and fell  sharply in Latin America. In Latin America, for example,  the wage bill share fell  by 8 percentage
points, other current spending rose by 2 points, capital spending by 6 points, and interest payments rose by
almost 18 percentage points, belying the contention that a growing wage bill -- rather  than debt service --
crowded out complementary public spending.  In Africa between 1980 and 1986,  interest payments rose by 9
points, and the shares of both capital spending and the wage bill remained constant, while nonwage current
spending fell almost five points and the deficits widened, so that it is true that the wage bill was not cut during
the initial years of increased constraints on noninterest expenditure (van Ginnekin 1990:445).
Robinson's survey of seven African countries, however, found that the wage bill had grown
substantially  in six of the seven (Robinson 1990:15)."  When the change in the wage bill was decomposed into
employment effects (a change in employment), salary effects (changes in the salary paid to each grade level),
structural effects (changes in the distribution  of employees  among  grade levels),  and cross-effects,  a differentiated
picture emerged.  In general, structural changes are less important than employment and salary effects. 9 In
three countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Togo), the employment  effect predominated. In Morocco, the effect of
employment  growth was slightly  less than the effect of salary increases, and in Tunisia, salary increases were by
far the most important factor in the growing  wage bill. In Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the employment  effect was
strongly negative,  but offset  by salary  increases in Sierra Leone, and barely offset  by salary and structural changes
in Nigeria. Finally,  for the three countries for which  time series are presented, the wage bili grew at a declining
rate over time.
Growth of government  emplovment  compared with other indicators. During the entire period
1980-86,  the rate of growth of government  employment -- excluding  public enterprises -- in Sub-Saharan  Africa
was greater than the rate of growth of the labor force. In seven of eight Latin American countries, government
employment grew faster than total employment  until 1984,  but after 1984  was equal to or less than the rate of
growth in the private sector.
In Africa during the late 1970s  and early 1980s,  the numbers of unskilled  civil  servants increased
relatively  faster than the overall rate of growth of the civil  service. One reason for this is that day laborers are
in a category separate from, other civil  service grades (and often unrecorded and untracked) in countries like
Nigeria,  Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia. When government hiring is frozen or capped, extra day laborers are hired
as a way around restrictions (Lindauer, Meesook, and Suebsaeng 1988:20).  An additional outcome of a shift in
skill composition over time in Asia has been increased dualism. The movement in some countries to enforce
protective labor and job security  laws for covered workers has led to a worsening of conditions  and skills -- and
possibly  of educational  levels  -- for uncovered  casual  and contract workers (Amjad and Edgren 1991:297;  Horton
and others 1991:56). The end result supports the picture drawn above--an uncontrolled expansion  of both the
number of civil servants and the total wage bill often go hand in hand with critical skill shortages.15
Impact on wages
Determining the impact of the public sector on wages in an economy requires micro data on
wages by the type of employment and skill level of workers.
Public/private  differentials.  The  data  on  public-private pay  differentials are  difficult to
interpret." 0 Heller and Tait find that the public sector in developing  countries underpaid in the aggregate in
the late 1970s/early  1980s. In OECD countries,  the shares of general government  wages  in total nonagricultural
wages and  of government employment in  total  employment were  similar (21  percent  and  19  percent,
respectively),  indicating  that the average wage in the public  and private  sectors was roughly  equal. In developing
countries, the ratios were 20 percent of wages and 26 percent of employment,  indicating that civil servants,  on
average, are underpaid relative to their private sector count  - arts (Heller and Tait 1984:12). The gap was
largest in Africa and smallest in Latin America (8 and 4 percentage points, respectively). These numbers were
not, and probably could not be, weighted by skill categories, so comparisons of average wages are misleading.
It is easy to imagine a country  where the percentage of unskilled labor in the public  sector is much larger than
in the private sector. Thus, because skill differentials  could be both cause and consequence  of cross-sectoral  pay
differentials, these latter do not necessarily  indicate public-private  pay differentials for similar workers.
van der Gaag and others (1989:82-85)  found public wages to be well below private wages in
CMte  d'Ivoire and Peru in 1985-86. They argue that traditional wage equations that compare sectors assume
incorrectly  that employees  are randomly distributed between the public and private sectors. If, on the contrary,
employees are distributed according to a selection process determined by the preferences of employers and
employees,  wage equation estimates--which  tend to show that public sector workers are better paid--are biased.
Wage equations estimated with more sophisticated  techniques  show that although  the average wage in the public
sector  was higher than  in  the  private sector  in both  countries, a  worker with the  average productive
characteristics  of his or her sector (age, sex, education,  marital status, experience),  will be offered a substantially
lower wage in the public sector than in the private sector.  Those who select public sector employment have
preferences, for example, for nonpecuniary  benefits and intangibles like job security, that are not measured by
the standard human capital variables.
The International Labor Office  (1990:17)  compared rates of pay  in the public  and private  sectors
across  three occupations  deemed to be comparable--computer  programmer,  office  clerk,  and stenographer-typist--
and found no systematic cross-country  differences  even though pay differentials within countries for the same
occupation could be large (up to 400 percent in isolated cases). A second ILO study (Robinson 1990)  also did
not find evidence  for the contention that the public  sector, particularly  in Africa,  pays more for unskilled  workers.
On the contrary, the private sector paid more for unskilled labor in six African countries in recent years (ILO
1990:18).  But, the ILO did fnd broad evidence of a pay differential  in favor of the private sector for higher-level
occupations in the early 1980s  in Africa, Asia and Latin America.16
A second useful comparison is the public sector wage relative to average income per capita.
In OECD countries, government workers earned (ca. 1980) on average, 1.74 times per capita GDP, but they
earned only 13 percent more than the average noncentral-government  worker in the formal sector." 1 In Asia,
and Latin America, central government  emp!oyees  earned almost three times the GDP per capita, and 1.3 times
the noncentral government wage in Latin America (Heiler and Tait 1984:18-19).  In Asia, although  government
workers earned, on average, 1.7 times the manufacturing  wage, there was great dispersion about the mean, with
government  wages  at or slightly  below wages  in industry for two countries--the  Republic of Korea and Sri Lanka
(0.95  and 0.99 respectively)  (Edgren 1987:15).  In Africa though, central government  workers earned 6 times the
GDP per capita, but only 80 percent of the average wage outside the central government, so that in spite of
massive income inequality  between the formal and informal economies,  government wages  are nonetheless low
relative to the private formal sector (Heller and Tait 1984:18-19).
These data are not only  dated, but also present a static picture. Employment  has grown in most
countries, sometimes at an alarming rate. There are countries in Africa like Ghana, Nigeria,  and Zambia where
civil  service  employment  grew at an nnual  rate of 15 percent for many years (1975-83)  (Lindauer, Meesook,  and
Suebsaeng 1988:2-3). Yet while employment  has risen, at least until recent years, real public sector wages  have
fallen in most developing  countries since the late 1970s  and early 1980s  for a number of reasons." 2 The picture
of a drop in real starting salaries has been sharpest in Africa (30 to 40 percent fall, on average, between 1975
and 1985),  and less so in Latin America (10 to 20 percent from 1980 to 1987). In countries like Ghana, Sudan
and Uganda, starting salaries fell 70 to 90 percent in real terms in the decade from the mid-1970s  (Lindauer
1991b:82). In Asia, the pattern is unclear.  In Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, for example, real wages have
fallen, and in Malaysia and Indonesia,  they have risen (van Ginnekin 1990:449;  Irfan and Ahmed 1985:426).  In
general, the effect on  performance has been severe, especially in Africa.  In Uganda, estimates are that
government  workers spend only one-third to one-half  of their working  day executing  the duties of office--the  rest
of the day is spent on acquiring outside income (Lindauer, Meesook, and Suebsaeng 1988:21). Although it is
difficult  to demonstrate causation  between reduced pay and reduced effort -- and to discount the effects of other
factors -- it is safe to hypothesize  that falling real wages hurt worker productivity.
Public. private and  parapublic sector comparisons.  A  1989 World Bank study (Levy and
Newman) provides indirect substantiation for the hypothesis  of endogenous wage determination in developing
country firms. Aggregate data for the modern sector in CMte  d'lvoire show a 16 percent drop in employment
during the 1979-84  recession  along with an 18 percent rise in real wages. It would  be erroneous to conclude  that
high wages contributed to lower employment, however.  Desegregated data show that the real wage fell for
specific types of labor.  The workforce at the end of the period had more education, training, and experience
than at the beginning  of the study, and workers with a given level of these attributes received a lower real wage17
at  the end  of the  recession than  at  the beginning.  This occurred in spite of a  drop in modern sector
employment.
Wages for retained workers in the public sector fell from 13 percent less than in the private
sector in 1979 to 19 percent less in 1984; for new hires, the wage differential increased from 4 percent less in
public firms to 16 percent less--even  when firm and worker characteristics  were accounted for. Thus, the public
sector (parastatal) effort to reduce the wage bill affected new employees more than the already-employed  (Levy
and Newman 1989:104-109).  Moreover, among workers who kept their jobs, 47 percent of the workers in the
public firms in the survey' 3 experienced a drop in real wages, but only 43 percent of retained workers in the
private sector experienced such a drop.  Thus, wage restraint in the public sector appears to have been less than
fully  transferred to private firms.
A recent study from Uruguay shows a reversal of public-private  pay differentials during the
1980s,  (Geller, 1991). In 1981,  with the base-100-December  1984,  the real wage was 130  for the economy, on
average; 135 for the public sector, and 126 for the private sector.  After a severe drop in 1983-84,  private wages
more than recovered so that by 1988,  the real wage was 121  for the whole economy,  111  in the public  sector, and
13  in the private sector.  Although the wages were the result of tripartite negotiations, and  not market-
determined, they nonetheless reflect increased constraints -- on and a real drop in -- public sec.or wages. In
general, public sector employees in Latin America seem to have been paid less than private sector employees
in the early-to-mid-1980s.' 4
The relationship between the  public, private and  parastatal sectors is difficult to  quantify.
Generally, civil  service pay is, lower than parastatal pay,  which is lower than private sector pay, except that the
public sector pays more at the lowest skill  levels (Robinson 1991:314).  Rough data for Africa for the early 1980s
support this picture (Lindauev,  Meesook, and Suebsaeng 1988:13).  As a result of pay differentials and the drain
on public sector skills and budgets," 5 some countries like Nigeria, Sudan, and Zambia attempted in the late
1970s to legislate pay equality between the civil  service and the parastatal sector.  The result was usually  even
less openness and  fairness in salary determination than  before, as  parastatals found ways to  circumvent
government restrictions.  If such ways  were not found, public enterprises were often unable to attract skilled
workers, or lost them to the domestic or foreign  private sector, thereby creating an additional hindrance to the
productive efficiency  of parastatals.
The minimum wae.  employment,  and skill formation. As in industrial countries, there is no
firm consensus about the effect of minimum  wages. Minimum wages  have been far higher and far lower than
reservation wages."  But now real wage erosion has severely affected the minimum wage in many African
countries so that it is far below GDP per capita.  Thus, distortions that might have existed have also eroded.
An unresolved question is whether minimum wage laws constrain the  incomes of a  significant number of
unskilled  workers, and therefore affect wages  and employment  (ILO 1990:22).  Camargo (1988:67-68)  found that18
about one-half of the percentage change in the minimum  wage (positive  or negative, nominal or real) in Rio de
Janiero was passed through to the median wage.  In Chile, changes in the minimum wage were "probably
important" in affecting average wages and the level of employment  of unskilled workers (Riveros 1990:17). In
contrast, the ILO (1990:24)  found no statistical relationship between changes in the re.d minimum wage and
lagged changes in real average manufacturing  earnings for six African and eight Latin American countries. The
answer to a second question -- whether the minimum wage is a disincentive to human resource development,
and therefore has indirect labor market effects -- is clearer.  There is substantial evidence,  not reviewed here,
to this effect. 17
On the general issue of incentives  for skills acquisition,  the ILO found no evidence  of narrower
pay differentials for skills in industrial relative to developed countries. Indeed, for many of eleven technical  and
skilled occupations,  the pay differential  ru.lative  to a construction  worker was often wider in developing  countries
(ILO  1990:20).'8  Thus, the wage compression evident in the  civil service of many countries has not had
spillover  effects on the private formal economy;  rather, the gap between public and private at higher skill levels
has widened. The ILO notes that no normative conclusions  can be drawn from these data about differentials
in any county being too low or too high, merely that there is no across-the-board relationship of pay levels  that
would by itself point to disincentives  for skills training in developing  countries.
The ILO study did not differentiate  among public  and private pay. However,  Heller and Tait's
study (1984) of public sector wage differentials also found few commonalities at the start of the 1980s. The
standard deviation  of wages  across public  sector positions  relative  to a clerical wage (= 100)  varied  widely  in 1980
across a selection of countries. It was rather high (120 to 135)  in some African and Caribbean countries. In the
most extreme case (Kenya),  the wage index  was 117,  for nurses relative to clerical workers 708 for doctors, 164
for primary school  teachers and 449 for secondary  school teachers, yielding  a standard deviation in Kenya  of 208
-- exceeded only by Trinidad and Tobago (Heller and Tait 1984:49). Although the data do not point to any
consistent pattern of wage compression, even by region, they do highlight differences in the returns to skills
acquisition. The impression is one of wages  administered in accordance  with political  economy criteria as much
as by any assessment of the market return to different skills. Furthermore, these data were collected  before the
fiscal crunches of the 1980s,  so the significant  wage compression  of the early to mid 1980s  would change some
of the numbers appreciably.
The importance  of nonwage benefits
There is little consensus and, indeed, a limited empirical literature on the importance of the
nonwage  component of total compensation  in the relationship between  government  pay and employment  policies,
on the one hand, and the nongovernmental  wage economy on the other. There is much anecdotal evidence about
the importance of nonwage benefits, but quantitative studies are few and do  not lead to easy cross-county19
generalizations. Nunberg (1988,  13) states pointedly  that there is little World Bank recognition  of the importance
of nonwage benefits in labor supply behavior.
One line of reasoning is that the total compensation package is the relevant variable for the
analysis of real wages  and that wages are a poor proxy." 9 In some countries, wages are only  about one-quarter
of total compensation, which may include housing, health care, pensions.  In Senegal for example, each job
category carries a premium,  which may  or may not have a functional  justification. All in all, 175  out of 250  items
of pay are different kinds of pay supplements (Bloch 1985:10). The result is a system with little openness or
horizontal equity.
The major fringe benefit in African countries is housing, which absorbs 25 to 35 percent of
household income (Lindauer, Meesook, and Suebsaeng 1988:7). Housing benefits accrue to both public and
private sector employees. In Nigeria in 1982,  for example,  housing allowances  as a percentage of median salary
were generally larger in the public sector; in Uganda, in 1983,  private sector housing allowances  were far less
than for public or parastatal employees  (Lindauer, Meesook, and Suebsaeng  1988:17). Other benefits like free
or subsidized  transport, health care, and family  allowances  are often substantial,  but impossible  to quantify, and
Lindauer, Meesook, and Suebsaeng's impression is that these are not substantial relative to wages, have not
increased as compensation for falling real wages, and -- de facto, if not de jure -- cover only a minority of
government  workers.
The few studies on nonwage benefits in Africa conclude that these are relatively  unimportant
in offsetting falling real wages because even a nonwage  salary supplement of several hundred percent may be
inadequate compensation for the drop in real wages (Lindauer, Meesook, and Suebsaeng 1988 Chew 1990).
Basic starting salaries fell in real terms in many African countries in the late 1970s  and early 1980s,  in many
cases, by more than the fall in real inceme per capita.  In Ghana, the real basic starting salary for a grade 2
employee (director) fell to 10 percent of its 1975  level by 1983,  while that of a grade 10 worker (messenger) feln
to 40 percent of its previous  level. In Uganda, top-level  starting salaries fell  by 1983  to 5 percent -- and unskilled
salaries to 15 percent -- of their 1975  level. Only one salary category  in one country -- workers with no diploma
in Senegal -- maintained its real value over the period in the review  of eight countries (Lindauer, Meesook, and
Suebsaeng 1988:5-8). Thus, there was both a precipitous drop in real value and significant  wage compression.
Similarly,  there was no Thange  in the overaii picture in Zambia when nonwage  benefits were
included in calculations  of total compensation packages. Lindauer and others (1988:10-11)  calculated  the trend
in real basic starting salaries under various assumptions. 20 When salary alone was measured, the salary of a
level S3 employee undersecretary was 45 percent of its real 1975 level in 1983 -- and the salary of a level S21
worker (the lowest category)  was 83 percent. Under the most optimistic  calculations,  the highly  paid employee's
salary dropped to only  69 percent of its 1975  level  by 1983,  and the lowest-paid  worker's salary maintained parity
(98 percent). Thus, Lindauer and others discount the importance of nonwage  benefits in Africa as compensating20
for falling real wages and suggest that real starting salaries are a robust proxy for the total remuneration of
government  workers over time. Chew (1990:1007-1008)  reaches the same conclusion  about Uganda during 1976-
88.
Robinson (1990) decomposed changes in the wage bill into employment,  salary, and structural
effects (see p. 15). He concurs that starting salaries are an imprecise  proxy  in Africa because some governments
have been willing  to make promotions easier as compensation for wage erosion.  However, wage erosion was
softened by only 5 to 20 percentage points, on average -- weakening,  but not changing  the trend.  And although
the observed trends in wage erosion and compression may be affected by such measures as more frequent
promotions, the mitigating effects are short-term, at best.  Further, increased rates of promotion, increased
nonwage benefits, and so on do not address the macroeconomic or employmnent  policy  reasons for the eroding
real wage.  On the contrary, such measures tend to make future trade-offs more severe by widening  the budget
deficit, and creating more high-level  salary earners for the future.
The unofficial  fringe benefits of some civil  service positions--access  to otherwise unavailable
goods and services, connections, bribery, and kickbacks are in certain cases large income increments.  This
unofficial  remuneration may or may not follow  the trend in real income. It is certainly  unquantifiable  and must
be discounted  for practical reasons. This omission  in calculations,  however,  does not change the overall picture
because those unofficial  benefits are a source of income that is either unavailable  or unimportant to the large
majority of civil  servants (teachers, laborers) (Lindauer, Meesook, and Suebsaeng 1988:10).
One  result  of  falling real  wages, especially in Africa,  has  been  stagnating government
productivity  per worker.  The drop in real salaries at higher levels  has encouraged the proliferation of special
allowances  and supplements,  made outright corruption more blatant and more acceptable, and led to reduced
working hours (ILO  1990:19;  Chew 1990:1009)  and  moonlighting (van der Gaag, Stelcner, and Vijverberg
1989:90). Indeed, Schiller (1988:31)  and Chew (1990:1010)  contend that the importance of nonwage benefits
from an analytical  perspective lies not in their quantitative trend compared with real wages  -- which is country
specific -- but in their  perverse  effect on productivity -- because  most  are  unrelated  to performance.
Data on wage compression
The distribution  of salary levels  among skills  and occupations  is country-specific  and extremely
difficult to compare within and across countries. There may be variance in wages, as well as in de facto wage
compression  by ministry,  by region,  or by  other parameters. Comparisons  are difficult  even within  an occupation.
For example, the measurement of wage per  unit of labor output of a primary school teacher, for example,
depends not only on skill and seniority,  but also on the number of hours taught, teacher-pupil ratios, and other
factors.  Nonetheless, the evidence of public sector wage compression  is overwhelming.21
In many countries, such as Zambia wage compression  has resulted from explicitly  redistributive
policies; in other countries, it has been more implicit, for example through wage increases of equal absolute
amounts across all twelve categories  examined. The effect has been widespread and severe compression. For
example, in Pakistan the ratio of the highest- to lowest- paid workers fell by two-thirds -- from 30:1 to 10:1 --
in 19170-84  (Irfan and Ahmed 1985:427).  In Ghana before civil  service  reforms, the ratio was 2.5:1  (Nunberg and
Nelis 1990:18). Lindauer and others (1988:12)  found increasing compression over time across a selection of
African countries. In Nigeria, the ratio of the highest-paid to lowest-paid  worker fell in real terms to less than
40 percent of its 1975 level .y 1983.
A study of the breakdown of public sector salaries by educational qualifications  reaches the
same conclusion about wage compression  (Colclough  1991:214-19).  In five African countries, the real starting
salary for a university  graduate fell between 1970 and the mid-to-late 1980s,  and by a greater percentage than
the real starting salary of any other skill group. 21 In all of the countries but Zambia, the real salary loss was
greater than the drop in per capita GNP.  When salary scales are used instead of starting salaries, as well as
when real wage trends recalculated by occupational  -- rather than educational -- levels  are taken into account,
the same wage compression is evident. If one assumes that the skill composition of the civil service did not
change fundamentally,  and Robinson (1990) concludes  that structural effects in Africa in the early 1980s  were
small  in  most  countries,  real  wage  cuts  -- although  not  necessarily  declines  in  real  income  --  have  been
consistently  borne disproportionately  by educated public sector labor force entrants.
ERternal  effects
Riveros (1992:19-20)  estimates the effect of a variable representing labor market distortions -
- the ratio of nonwage  labor costs to per capita income on the level of manufactured  exports. 22 The hypothesis
tested is the common  notion that high  non-wage  costs of labor in the formal sector--either  government-mandated
or union-negotiated--in developing countries are a distortion in the labor market that keeps the cost of labor
above market-clearing levels, thereby affecting international competitiveness. A group of countries is divided
into "regulated"  ones, where non-wage  costs and regulations  both exist  and are enforced, and "liberal'  ones, where
such regulations are  quantitatively less  important  or  not  enforced.'  Riveros finds that  the  existence/
enforcement of  labor  market  distortions has  a  statistically significant negative effect on  non-traditional
(manufactured) exports, and concludes that the removal of distortions,  whether they be government-mandated
or spillovers  from the public sector, may have a positive effect on exports.
Another Riveros study (1990:37)  concluded  on the basis of an empirical study  of Chile that the
expenditure-reducing  and expenditure-switching  policies of macroeconomic  adjustment should be accompanied
by labor market deregulation (i.e., measures aimed at lessening  segmentation) in order to minimize  the adverse
effects and inequitable impacts of macroeconomic  reforms designed to bring about external adjustment. Thus,22
public  sector pay and employment policies can have negative effects also for international competitiveness,  and
measures aimed at improving  competitiveness  can be hampered by public sector rigidities.
The general picture that emerges from this review  supports the stylized  facts about public sector
pay, employment, and performance in developing  countries.  The imbalances  between the public and private
sectors  on the one hand, and between employment  and pay objectives  within the public  sector on the other hand,
are most obvious and severe in Africa, and to a lesser extent, in Latin America.  In Asia, there are some
countries which fit the picture, but the variance in all indicators is large.
Overall,  the public  sector has a structurally  more important role in developing  than in industrial
co-untries.  Among  other  things,  it  affects  formal-sector  wage  determination,  although  not  always
straightforwardly. The public sector is large relative to the level of output, and it crowds out non-wage, non-
interest government spending. The sector has grown larger -- relative  to a variety  of indicators -- for many years.
Employment has expanded in tandem with massive wage compression  and real wage erosion, but employment
growth has abated in recent years.
Labor  market  effects -- static and dynamic -- are  harder  to sketch.  Public sector  wage policies
are clearly important determinants of labor supply and demand, particularly  when they create segmentation.
Attempts to control public sector growth have tended to increase segmentation  among unskilled workers. Low
and compressed wages -- relative to the parapublic and private formal sectors -- have created a disincentive  for
human resource development in many countries and have drained the public sector of skilled workers.
It  is segmentation -- the  parallel and  distinct markets that have grown out of cumulative
interventions  -- rather than any given public sector pay or employment policy that is damaging in a closed
economic model.  For example, several high-income, relatively  high-growth OECD countries have high and
administered wages -- and  with wage compression far greater  than in  most developing countries. 24 But,
coverage is economywide,  so segmentation is minimal -- although international competitiveness  may well be
affected.  In an open economy, the effects of public sector pay and employment distortions depend on the
structure of the productive  sector and the incidence  of the interventions  upon it. Technical  competence is critical
in whether interventions  become distortions--interventions  that are appropriately  designed  and implemented may
be minimally  distorting. However,  the data base needed for such policy  finesse  -- particularly  in the face of large
and sudden intertemporal shifts -- is the exception  rather than the rule.
In general, public sector pay and employment rigidities hinder the full adjustment of labor
markets to macroeconomic  policy  changes. But the dynamic  impact of any given intervention also depends upon
the economic,  sectoral, legal, and socio-political  context. For example, Horton and others (1991:42)  compare
the effects of wage indexation during adjustment in two Latin American countries.  In Brazil, although wage
indexation contributed to hyperinflationary  tendencies, the battle over wages  really reflects underlying  political-
economic tensions about the distribution of output among social groups.  In Costa Rica, by contrast, there was23
a high degree of social  consensus  about necessary  reforms. In that case, the wage indexation mechanism  helped
to moderate wage inflation.
E.  Conclusions  And Policy Implications
There is ample evidence of the high efficiency costs of public sector pay and employment
interventions in economies where this sector overshadows and affects all formal private economic activity.
Therefore, much effort has been devoted to reducing the size of the public sector, increasing its efficiency,  and
lessening its effects on  private economic activity. The partial success of reform efforts has focused greater
attention on the political economy of public sector pay and employment  reforms.  This review  of several recent
cross-country comparisons of  reform  efforts  points  up  some  lessons about  the  importance  of  political
considerations for effective public sector analysis. In addition although further research is needed in several
areas, some important policy messages can be drawn.
Reforms in sestor pay and employment
Because of the primacy  of labor markets to economic  competitiveness  -- and the negative effects
a large or inefficient  public sector can have on labor market competitiveness  and the overall  economy -- recent
World Bank lending programs have focused on these issues.  Indeed, public and parapublic sector pay and
employment  issues are at the top of the policy agenda in Africa (Lindauer 1991a:831). A recent World Bank
review  of the macroeconomic  implications  of public  sector deficits (Easterly  and Schmidt  .Hebbel 1991:30)  found
that  a  loss of control over public sector wages and employment levels was a  major contributor to  fiscal
deterioration, and that regaining control was essential to adjustment in eight of ten countries studied. Another
World Bank survey of some adjustment programs found that civil service reform was addressed -- in all of the
countries studied (Stevenson  1991:21-22).  Reforms may focus  on the entire public  sector, the ,ivil service,  public
enterprises, or on parts of these -- only teachers and health care workers, for example.
In the environment  of fiscal  stringency,  a major policy  objective  in recent years has been to stop
or slow the growth of the civil  service. This focus is a major policy  shift, in that the initial  response to economic
crisis in the late 1970s  and early 1980s  in many countries was to expand the public sector.'  The new emphasis
on public sector retrenchment has met with limited support in most countries where it has become policy. A
common  outcome,  observed before and during  managed reforms,  has been wage  flexibility  without  labor mobility.
As discussed, in many countries, the real wage and the real exchange rate have fallen substantialy during
managed or ad hoc adjustment,  creating as environment  conducive  to the movement of labor from the production
of nontradables to tradables. In many of the -- mostly  African -- countries studied by Nunberg and Nellis (1990:24
34) and others, labor has moved into the agricultural and informal sectors with surprising ease.  Nonetheless,
mobility has been more limited than would be suggested by the, at times, precipitous drop in real wages.'
One set of explanations  is methodological  -- the tendency of studies to focus on wages, rather
than on the entire compensatory package; and the importance of unofficial  benefits.  There is anecdotal and
impressionistic  evidence that the unmeasurable perquisites of civil service employment -- access to  bribes,
corruption, skimming  of goods and services,  or the intangibles  of social status, connections, and implicit  security
--are equally important in influencing  labor supply behavior. A second set of explanations  is theoretical--the
inflexibility  of capital (credit) markets, which hampers labor's mobility  due to a lack of complementary inputs;
or product market rigidities and demand-side problems (see section A).
A third set of explanations  concern political  economy factors. Experience in many developing
countries highlights the unique role of -- and expectations about -- the public sector in the domestic political
economy. The distributive effects of public sector retrenchment are usually clear and immediate for certain
influential  groups. The government's primary constituency  is the urban labor force, of which it employs a large
share.  When macroeconomic restructuring is implemented, any attempt to spread the burden most efficiently
will affect the urban working class (civil servants), who may take to the streets as a result.  Any attempt to
protect government  workers from the effects of retrenchment, however  tends to affect others -- the private  wage
sector, the informal sector, and rural areas -- more severely. Thus, the trade-offs,  while technically  the same,
are more consequential in developing  than in industrial countries, where there is less income inequality and
relatively  fewer people live at or below subsistence (Riveros 1991:26).
In any case, one lesson learned from the generally slow pace of civil service reform is that a
single-minded  focus on the wage bill or the number of civil  servants is ineffective. Three structural issues need
to be considered simultaneously:  the balance between wage and nonwage spending, the balance between the
number of civil servants and their pay levels within a given wage bill, and the development of a  pay and
compensation package that is conducive  to good performance (Schiller  1988:3). All the elements of government
pay and employment--pay,  grades, supplements,  legal and illegal  perquisites--are related, and pressure on one
often  triggers an  adaptive response elsewhere in  the system (Schiller 1988:32).  As a  first  step toward
comprehensiveness,  most recent World Bank-supported  programs address both wages and employment,  and --
within employment -- its level and composition in the targeted sectors.  Wage decompression is particularly
important because of the depressing effects of low wages on performance, recruitment, and the retention of
skilled -- particularly  technical  and  professional  -- workers.
A recent study of civil  service reforms in regard to the education sector found that 65 percent
of the countries with World Bank-supported civil  service  reforms, had frozen or capped, the total wage bill, while
it was to increase in only 20 percent of countries studied. Most often, an increase in the total wage bill was the
result of a proposed decompression of the civil service salary scale (Stevenson 1991:21),  to be achieved by25
removing  the constraints on higher-level  salaries or allowing  the real minimum wage to fall more than higher-
level salaries.  The study found that progress was slow.
Another  World Bank study of fifteen countries with Bank-supported civil service reform
programs also found mixed results. 27 Although a primary goal of most of the programs was to reduce the
aggregate wage bill,  in ten of fifteen countries -- including  those in which reforms had progressed furthest --
the wage bill as a share of government spending actually increased.  Of the six countries with data on wage
compression, half had decompression and half had further compression. There was virtually no progress on
reducing or rationalizing  nonwage benefits (Nunberg and Nellis 1990:17-22).
Although there  was little fiscal improvement, there  was some progress on  employment
reduction.  Eight of the fifteen countries were able to implement some reductions,  although three (Cameroon,
Ghana, and Jamaica) had at least temporary slippage  ex post. In the other seven countries, the rate of growth
of employment  remained more or less unchanged. All in all, net employment  reductions were minimal,  and not
enough to generate sufficient savings to  increase pay levels for remaining civil servants to compensate for
previous years' salary erosion and compression (Nunberg and Nellis 1990:23).
Thus, the public sector -- measured variousi, by the wage bill or the level of employment --
continued to grow throughout the 1980s,  although at a decreasing rate.  In spite of the real wage trend, public
sector employment continues to have great appeaL based in many countries -- particularly in Africa -- on
expectations about job security and status without enforced performance standards, and on opportunities for
moonlighting  and rent-earning. This situation has perhaps changed in some countries in recent years -- largely
due  to  the  influence of  the international development community -- but progress has been  slower than
anticipated.
The political economy of reforms
Colclough (1991:222)  argues that in Africa, several factors work against wage restraint and
public sector decompression.  First is the commonly held view -- to which the government is often publicly
committed -- that more generous compensation  at lower rather than higher levels  is equity-enhancing.  A second
factor is the high public profile of the minimum wage, even outside the formal sector.  When given the choice
between higher wages  and more employment  opportunities for the unskilled,  African governments  tend to prefer
higher wages over more jobs.  A higher public sector wage for the unskilled (minimum  wage) translates into
higher expectations for both actual and potential job seekers. It may also bring direct benefits to rural areas in
the form of increased remittances.'  Thus, it is easy for governments to garner support for a "high"  public
sector minimum wage, and  the  counter-arguments about decreased income equity, increased rural-urban
migration,  induced unemployment  and underemployment,  lower output, are harder for governments  to publicize26
effectively. So, wage restraint has been relatively  unsuccessful  in Africa because it has not been in the interests
of governments to restrain wages  at the bottom--even when to do so was a stated policy  goal.
Similar arguments are put forth for the inv- bility  of decompressing  wages  by raising pay at the
top.  Robinson (1991:314)  argues that raising the salaries -- real and nominal -- of skilled workers for whom
there is the greatest demand in the public sector would add very little to the total wage bill and a great deal to
output and efficiency. The fact that wage decompression  has nonetheless proved difficult to implement points
to the widespread appeal of wage equalization as a social policy  objective.
The evidence  about the political  economy of falling  real wages  is also mixed. Colclough  (1991:
223) argues that the drop in real wages during the late  1970s and  1980s in Africa was not caused by any
commitment to wage restraint, but primarily  by a shift in approach to exchange  rate management.  Previously,
an increasingly  overvalued exchange rate helped raise the real wage in the modern sector.  The reversal of
approach toward exchange  rate management was responsible for the decline in real wages more than was any
move toward market determination in government wage-setting  policies.  These wage-setting policies remtain
l, ;gely beholden to the same political  influences  as in the years of public sector real wage growth. Edgren (1987:
19) questions whether officials are assumed to have outside income -- and hence an implicit acceptance of a
corrupt or moonlighting  civil  service  -- because pubiic  sector salaries in some Asian countries have so obviously
fallen well below subsistence levels.
Nunberg and Nellis (1990:34)  put a positive light on the slow pace of public sector reforms.
Although the effects to date have been "negligible,"  the authors note that political resistance has been less than
anticipated -- regimes have not been destabilized, and there  have been no  social upheavals.  They caution,
however, that most of the programs were in Africa, where labor is less well-organized  politically  than in other
regions. The conclusion  they reach is not that slow reforms indicate a lack of underlying  support, but that the
absence of serious political  resistance reflects both the need for -- and perhaps a growing  acceptance of -- more
civil service restructuring.
Policy  implications
The picture sketched  above must be interpreted with considerable  sensitivity  to country-specific
and region-specific  characteristics. The common  maxim that public  sector wages  are "too high,"  and they distort
wages throughout the modern sector, is an oversimplification  that applies primarily  to unskilled  workers in some
countries, mostly in Africa. The long-term fall in real wages  in many countries has been massively  documented.
In response, sectoral shifts of labor have generally  been in the predicted direction -- from the nontradable to the
tradable goods sector. 29 The magnitude of the shift, however,  has seldom been as large as projected, and net
employment in the public sector has remained remarkably resistant to adjustment.  The difficulty  of adjusting
the supply of labor in the public sector may be the result of the political preference for adjusting the price of27
public sector labor rather than the supply, labor's revealed preference for public sector employment, or both.
In either case, the distorting effects on labor markets remain.
Three lessons can be drawn from this review about the effects of public sector pay and
employment policies  on labor markets. The first is that policies  do matter -- each intervention  has to be weighed
in terms of economic and social costs and benefits to everyone. The effect of any policy  may or may not be
measurably distorting, but the cumulative  effect over time of a large and inflexible  public sector can be clearly
segmenting,  and thus detrimental for the entire economy. The prospects for inflexible  economies are less than
bright for three reasons: continuing fiscal and demographic pressures; a continuing  need for flexible  response
to  rapidly changing economic circumstances; and a  parallel shift in many countries away from command
economies toward more open, market-oriented systems. Thus, both macroeconomic  and public sector policies
that reduce flexibility  and introduce segmentation  between the formal and informal  -- or covered and uncovered
--  sectors  need  to  be  examined  with  care.  Also,  mere  desegmentation  is  not  enough  -- the  provision  of
appropriate education and training is an essential component of labor mobility.
The second lesson is that the analysis  of presumed distortions mist be approached cautiously--
simple theory and aggregate data do not always  provide adequate explanations. The World Bank has been the
most active participant in the collection  and analysis  of data, and the design of programs to address public  sector
imbalances.  Still, more applied research would provide a better  data base upon which to build the policy
dialogue with governments. What is the nature and extent of labor market segmentation? How do government
policies -- singularly  and collectively  -- contribute to segrnentation? How do macroeconomic  and labor market
reforms affect one another?  One problem is that even when civil  service data are comprehensive  and accurate,
there is limited information about comparable private sector opportunities and about the absorptive  capacity  of
the private sector -- formal and informal.  More public-private  comparisons are needed-that which take into
account job security,  hours worked,  pensions, and other benefits. The use of earnings functions  would  shed light
on how changes in education, experience, skill,  and other human resource parameters are related to changes in
the aggregate wage. There is also limited information about the intended and actual functions of labor market
institutions and about policies -- short-term compensatory and long-term -- that would aid the institutions'
flexibility  in responding to changing  circumstances. Both of these issues are being addressed in recent country-
specific analyses,  but more work is needed.
The final lesson is that public sector labor market institutions and policies do not exist in a
narrow economic context. The slow pace of public sector reform programs has perhaps demonstrated that it
is the underlying  attitudes that are rigid. Public  sector labor market interventions  reflect these attitudes, so their
selective removal will be necessary -- but not sufficient  -- for sustainable reforms.  Measures to reduce public
sector wage compression or levels of employment have largely been  and will continue to be-half-heartedly
implemented unless the  underlying presumptions about wage equalization and  the social value of public
employment are addressed.28
Endnotes
1.  The literature that examines  empirical  links between policies  and growth is vast,  yet inconclusive. Some
studies have found that the government spending/GDP or the rate of growth of government spending
are negatively  correlated with  economic  growth (rate of growth of GDP). One empirical  study of thirty-
one countries found that labor market distortions -- defrned in part through evidence of government
interventions in labor markets -- accounted for about 10 percent of the variation in economic growth
(Agarwala 1983:27). Other  studies have found no correlation (World Bank 1988:51-52). A recent
methodological  study  questions  the robustness of the relationship  between  policy  variables  and economic
growth and finds the correlation of alI policy variables (except investment/GDP) with growth to be
fragile.  The authors  hypothesize  that  no single policy -- including government  size -- is demonstrably
detrimental or crucial to growth (Levine and Renelt 1990).
2.  There  is no  consensus however in the industrial country (largely U.S.) literature about whether a
minimum wage has a measurable negative impact on employment  in general, or on specific  groups like
young people.
3.  See Adams and others (1991) for a summary of the literature.
4.  See Riveros (1991) for a review  of the literature on wage indexation in developing  countries.
5.  Although the discussion is couched in terms of wages, the relevant variable is the real cost of labor,
which may or may not move in the same direction as the real wage.  See below for a review of the
literature on whether public sector wages are an acceptable proxy  for total labor cost.
6.  Indeed, Gelier (1991:187)  argues that labor market deregulation  in Latin America is aimed not only at
generating employment,  but at normalizing  the illegal flexibility  that already exists.
7.  All data from Heller and Tait (1984) refer to the years 1979-81. Although the numbers for individual
countries may have changed, there has been no comprehensive  update, and it is safe to say  that broad
comparisons  remain accurate.
8.  The countries are Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Tunisia.  Wage bill
growth ranged from 1.1 percent (Nigeria, 1980-85)  to 322.7  percent (Kenya, 1980-87).
9.  Structural changes included laying  off unskilled workers at lower grades and moving  employees  up job
ladders to compensate for increased  responsibilities  as unskilled  workers were laid off. Salary inflation
can also compensate for falling real wages. Only in Nigeria does it appear that salary increases and
upgrading  offset the effects of retrenchment, leading to a very  modest increase in the wage bill. Chew
(1990) also presents evidence of compensatory  upgrading in Uganda.
10.  See van der Gaag, Stelcner, and Vijverberg  (1989) for a synopsis  of recent empirical studies.
11.  The formal sector includes  nonfinancial  public  enterprises, state and local government, anJ the private
sector.
12.  See for example,  Colclough  (1991);  World Bank (1991);  Chew (1990);  Robinson (1990);  ILO (1990);  van
Ginnekin (1990);  Nunberg  and NeUlis  (1990);  Lindauer,  Meesook and Suebsaeng  (1988);  Nunberg (1988);
Schiller (1988); Murshid and Sobhan (1987); Irfan and Ahmed (1985); and Heller and Tait (1984).
13.  Public firms are defined as at least 50 percent publicly  owned. n - + 10,600  workers.29
14.  See, for example, Lopez and Riveros (1989).
15.  Lindauer et al. (1988:15)  note that these are related issues. The government  is disadvantaged  vis a vis
the  state-owned sector in two ways.  First, the state-owned sector receives financial resources and
second, it uses these resources to attract skilled workers away from the civil  service.
16.  In Burkina Faso in the early 1980s  for example,  the minimum  wage was more than 900 CFA per month,
while the going rate for a laborer was about 150  CFA.  In Thailand however, the first minimum  wage
(1973) was 12 baht/day, only  about half of the going  wage for unskilled non-agricultural  labor (ILO).
17.  See, for example, Lopez 1992 (forthcoming).
18.  Salaries from the years 1985-88. They are usually average salaries, and do not differentiate between
public and private wage rates.
19.  For example, Nunberg (1988, 13) contends that  nonpecuniary benefits offset the  effects of wage
compression  and salary erosion, particularly  in Africa, and are therefore important in influencing  labor
supply  behavior. van der Gaag and Vijverberg  (1988:251)  find nonwage  benefits probably important in
influencing  labor supply behavior in Cote d'Ivoire. Riveros (1991,  12n.) finds that although  real wages
have fallen in countries like Columbia and Venezuela, real labor costs have not changed due to the
offsetting increases in nonwage compensation.
20.  Assumptions included a housing allowance  or imputed rent, incorporation of salary progression, and
salaries net of taxes for both single people and heads of household.
21.  The countries are Botswana,  the Gambia, Kenya,  Sierra Leone, and Zambia. The initial  year is 1970,
1971  or 1972,  and the most recent year varies from 1983  to 1987. Educational categories are unskilled,
primary, middle secondary, higher secondary, and university  graduate.
22.  High nonwage labor costs are not necessarily distorting--the total may be market-clearing, and the
balance may reflect the negotiated preferences of employers and employees. However, nonwage  costs
exogenously  imposed by the government  would be distorting. Thus, in a cross-country  context, a high
ratio of nonwage  costs to per capita income, the opportunity  cost of labor -- is an appropriate proxy for
the level of formal sector labor market distortion in a country (Riveros, 17n.)
23.  Hong Kong and Korea  are countries in the  study in which the minimum wage and job security
respectively  are quantitatively  unimportant, and Nigeria exemplifies  countries where laws on the books
are largely unenforced.
24.  For example, a doctor earns only 1.5 times more than a clerical worker in Sweden,  and only twice as
much in Australia, yielding standard deviations across all public sector occupations  of only 18 and 29
respectively  (Helier and Tait 1984:49).
25.  The growth of the public sector as a response to economic crisis is documented in studies of Egypt,
Malaysia,  and all five Latin American countries studied by Horton and others (1991:43).
26.  See for example, Nunberg and Nellis (1990:23),  Riveros and others (1990:1).
27.  The authors caution that both reviews are snapshots of countries in different stages of implementation,
and that few of the programs are long standing.
28.  Coldough cites Botswana, where two-thirds  of rural households  received some remittances from urban
workers in 1977. However, Adams contends that the equity impacts may be negative in the case of
Egypt because remittances are earned mostly by upper-income villagers  (World Bank 1991:47).30
29.  Several authors note that sectoral shifts have led to increased (relative) employment in agriculture in
those countries where food is a tradable good, a shift that flies in the face of traditional notions of
development's entailing movement from agriculture into the modern sector (see Horton and others
1991:56).31
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